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Abstract. The concept ‘affordance’ has been adopted from ecological 
psychology into various fields of research. The wide adoption signals for the 
usefulness of the concept, but may also create confusion. We have become alert 
towards the ambiguous uses of the term – a feature that originates in J.J. Gibson’s 
ambiguous texts. To contribute to this deliberation, we identified ‘affordances of 
a chair’ as the most popular ‘affordance example’ in research literature. We 
analyzed a set of examples through a Heideggerian lens to reveal variations in 
the operationalization of the concept. Our paper does not aim to provide any 
absolute answer for the right use of the affordance concept. We wish to contribute 
to the ongoing debate on affordances; particularly in our own IS community. As 
academic writers, we should be conscious of the exact meanings of the concepts 
we use. Thus, this essay questions the affordance concept as a one-size-fits-all 
solution to characterize the relation between artifacts and their users. We suggest 
future research to address the conceptual specificity dilemma: should we 
supplement affordance with new concepts, or should we replace affordance with 
something better? 
Keywords: affordance, Heidegger, familiarity, affordances 
1   Introduction 
Originating from James J. Gibson’s work in ecological psychology [e.g. 1], affordance 
is a relational concept implying certain environment-provided action-opportunities for 
a person or an animal. Affordance has been widely adopted into human-computer 
interaction [2, 3], ergonomics [4], neuropsychology [5], and autonomous robotics [6]. 
It has recently gained importance in our Information Systems (IS) domain [7-11], 
increasingly after Markus & Silver’s [12] paper from 2008. 
As the concept has spread into different settings of research and practice, its uses 
have also varied. While some of the variation may be entitled to “wrong” appropriations 
of the term, in the line of how Torenvliet [13] is arguing, much of it actually comes 
from the original source of J.J. Gibson’s writings. Gibson never claimed affordance as 
just one formalization, but insisted that his ideas were constantly in progress, and thus 
“subject to revision” [1] (p. 67). Additionally, his writings contradict with each other. 
Among these contradictions are the claim of affordances being relational yet exist 
independent of us, the insistence that the relationship is perceptual not agential, and the 
insistence that affordances in nature are exactly the same as in man-made world [14] 
(p. 48-49). This has resulted in post-Gibsonian scholars cherry-picking different “facts” 
to back their own needs. This is visible in the myriad of affordance definitions [6]. 
Regardless that the term has gained much support in IS field, we are somewhat 
skeptical towards the use of this concept. Are we speaking of the same thing across 
different studies and contexts? We suspect that researchers do not attach a consistent 
meaning to this concept. 
Let us therefore propose an instant social experiment. We as the authors of this 
article will now kindly ask you, the reader, to approach any academic person and ask 
her this question: “What is an affordance?” Listen carefully to what the academic 
answers. Now tell us, did the answer include something about chairs and sitting? To 
our experience, people familiar with the affordance concept tend to use chairs and 
sitting as their preferred example when trying to make a layman understand what the 
concept is about. Now ask the same question from the Google search engine, and you 
will find chairs and sitting in surprisingly many of the links in the search results. 
Scholars have attempted to provide conclusive definitions for the affordance concept 
[6, 15-17]. However, the quest to track its definite meaning is still ongoing. Instead of 
providing a definition a priori, we argue that concepts reveal their nature through their 
actual uses. In this paper, we use Heidegger’s perspective to analyze research texts 
where chair is provided as an example to demonstrate the affordance concept. 
Thereafter, we derived some understanding of affordances to IS research. We focus on 
these concepts from Heidegger’s Being and Time [18]: familiarity, readiness-to-hand, 
present-at-hand, referential totality, breakdown, equipment, and referential totality. 
This paper is structured as follows. In the following section, we briefly describe our 
methodology. We then present eight examples of how “chair” is used as an example of 
the affordance concept in multidisciplinary scholarly literature. Then we present our 
take on the Heideggerian perspective. Subsequently, we apply the Heideggerian lens to 
analyze the literature, and discuss the implications of this analysis to guide future 
research. 
2   Research method 
This essay aims to provide a Heideggerian interpretation to different variations of how 
“affordances of a chair” has been offered as an example in extant research literature. 
Our “Heideggerian” stance is aligned with ideas provided in Martin Heidegger’s 
magnum opus “Being and Time” [18]. 
We conducted Google Scholar searches through which we identified academic 
literature discussing affordances of a chair. We then chose eight examples. This 
literature is derived from multiple fields and disciplines, including management [19], 
philosophy [20], and ergonomics [21]. After we present these examples, we discuss 
each of these through the Heideggerian perspective. 
3   Eight examples of “affordances of a chair” 
In this section, we offer eight instance of using “chair” as a means to demonstrate the 
meaning of the affordance concept. We present these examples in the chronological 
order. 
3.1   Michael & Still (1992) 
In an essay published in the Theory & Society journal, Michael & Still [22] discuss 
Gibsonian affordances from the (mainly Foucauldian) view of power-knowledge. 
“Objects and places in the environment, say a city, afford certain behaviors that are 
usually proscribed. A lampost1 is not for climbing up, and yet it affords climbing up 
and a better vantage point. There is thus present in the environment a resource for 
resistance (just as there is also a resource for discipline - a lampost can serve 
panoptical ends). All around in the physical environment of surfaces are affordances 
that have been touched by disciplinary power, but which also reflect the ecological 
forces that relate organism to environment. Disciplinary power tells us that a chair is 
for sitting on, but ecological perception permits us to see that it affords standing upon, 
throwing, lying over, scratching against, and so on. There is a latitude, a collection of 
affordances, that inheres in the ecology of the situation and that outstrips the more or 
less meagre possibilities demarcated by power-knowledge.” (p. 881) 
3.2   Dreyfus (1996) 
Our second example comes from Hubert Dreyfus [20], who has been called one of “the 
foremost interpreters of the work of Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty in the American 
continental tradition” [23] (p. 540). In this article [20], Dreyfus refers to “affordances 
of a chair” as follows: 
 
”(…) to Western human beings a chair affords sitting. Because we have the sort of 
bodies that get tired and that bend backwards at the knees, chairs can show up to us - 
but not flamingos, say - as affording sitting. But chairs can only solicit sitting once we 
have learned to sit. Finally, only because we Western Europeans are brought up in a 
culture where one sits on chairs do they solicit us to sit on them. Chairs would not 
solicit sitting in traditional Japan.” 
3.3   Dainoff & Mark (2001) 
Dainoff & Mark [21] discuss the affordance concept in a section in the International 
Encyclopedia of Ergonomics and Human Factors. 
“Affordance refers to a fundamental relationship in ergonomics – between the user 
and those elements in the world with which the user interacts during the performance 
                                                          
1 In the original text ”lamp post” is indeed written as ”lampost”. 
of goal-directed actions. … a conceptual tool for ergonomists to assess goodness to fit” 
(p. 1080) 
“Consider the simple problem of sitting down to eat a meal. We assume that the user 
will require both a chair and a table. (This assumption includes an implicit recognition 
of a broader social/cultural context including the act of eating being accompanied by 
eye contact and conversation among a group of diners.) These two elements of the 
environment (chair and table) should afford the possibility of the user being able to 
attain a reasonable posture while manipulating eating tools (knife, fork, spoon) and 
food objects. The question is: can a typical dining room chair be considered an 
affordance for the particular action sequence called sitting down to eat? The answer is 
yes only if the user in question is an adult. It would not be an affordance if the user in 
question is a three-year old child. Thus, within the definition of affordance we are 
required to simultaneously assess the physical characteristics of the chair and table 
along with the capabilities of the user – in this case, anthropometric attributes such as 
leg height and seated elbow height.” (p. 1081) 
3.4   Torenvliet (2003) 
In the interactions issue of July/August 2003, Gerard Torenvliet [13] wrote an article 
titled “We Can’t Afford It! : The Devaluation of a Usability Term”. In this article he 
argued that an emphasis on perception has decreased the value of the affordance 
concept. Instead, he stressed the need to focus on the “actual properties of a thing in 
relation to a user” (p. 17). 
“It is no coincidence that we speak of affordances in the environment with the suffix 
of “ability”—sit-ability, stand-ability, or push-ability. Affordances are things the 
environment has the ability to furnish an animal. They are opportunities for action. So, 
the chair I am currently sitting on is sit-able for me, an adult male. Two things need to 
be stressed. First, affordances exist independently of perception. Even in a dark room 
where I could not see my chair, it would still be sit-able for me. Second, affordances 
exist only as a relationship between an organism and an object; they are not properties 
of an object by itself. The chair that has the affordance of sit-ability for me does not 
have that same affordance for my six-month old daughter. She cannot sit, so the 
environment cannot have that affordance for her—at least not yet.” (p. 14) 
3.5   Jarzabkowski and Pinch (2013) 
Jarzabkowski and Pinch [19] also take chairs as an example when discussing 
affordance. They emphasize human agency for appropriating chair for many purposes: 
“(…) problem is that affordances, perhaps because of their association with 
Gibson’s original formulation of the term, give too much power over the types of social 
interaction permissible to the object doing the ‘affording’ (…). Often an affordance is 
simply equated with the ‘function’ of an object, such as the fact that the function of a 
chair is for sitting. The function of the object not only delimits the agency of the object 
but also ascribes a fixed intention or motivation to the person using the object. Thus a 
chair is for sitting on and people, when they interact with a chair, have the 
unambiguous intention of sitting on it.” (p. 582) 
3.6   Costall & Richards (2013) 
In a book section of The Oxford Handbook of the Archaeology of the Contemporary 
World, Costall & Richards [24] discuss “canonical affordances”:  
“A chair is for-sitting-on whether or not anyone happens to be using it for that 
purpose. And it remains a chair even when someone is standing on it to change a light-
bulb. Its ‘canonical affordance’ – the thing it is for (Costall 1995) – is objective, or 
better, impersonal (Morss 1985): ‘one sits on chairs’. Nevertheless, canonical 
affordances still imply us, but in the plurality than the singular.” (p. 87) 
3.7   Costall (2014) 
Alan Costall [14] further elaborates on the notion of “canonical affordances” in his 
chapter in the book Rethinking Creativity: Contributions from Social and Cultural 
Psychology: 
 
“I coined the term “canonical affordances” to capture the fact that many of the 
objects surrounding us have a single, definitive meaning …. For example, a chair is for 
sitting on, whether or not anyone is sitting on it, or using it instead to ward off an 
attacking lion, or standing on it to change a light bulb. One sits on chairs. And so – it 
would seem – in the case of man-made affordances most of their uses are not, after all, 
makers or creators but recipients of already established meanings.” (p. 51) 
3.8   Keane (2014) 
Our last example comes from an article in the journal Anthropological Theory, in which 
Keane [25] discusses affordances and reflexivity: 
“So another crucial point to stress is (mere) potentiality: a chair may invite you to 
sit but it does not determine that you will sit. You may instead use it as a stepladder, a 
desk, a paperweight, a lion tamer’s prop, to burn as firewood, to block a door, to hurl 
at someone. Or you may not use it at all. Affordances are properties of the chair vis-à-
vis human activity. As such they are real, and exist in a world of natural causality (they 
can hold down loose objects or catch fire), but they do not cause people to respond to 
them in any particular way.” (p. 7) 
4   Heideggerian perspective (HP) 
The objective of bringing Heidegger’s perspective is not to delve into philosophical 
discussion of ‘Being and Time’ [18], but to see its relevance in clarifying the concept 
of affordances. Some useful terms are as follows. 
Familiarity: Dasein (being-there) means that our mode of existence is different from 
other entities because we are immersed in activities. We are social, “we inhabit a world, 
we are capably engaged in a meaningful context. Our world is the context in terms we 
understand ourselves, and within which we become who we are.” [26] (p. 30). 
Heidegger expressed that being-in-the-world means we are thrown into a context where 
we have a place in a meaningful whole where we deal or encounter with equipment and 
other Dasein. For example, the society in which the wedding ceremony is conducted 
have pre-understanding ‘familiarity’ of the context, at the same time the role of chair 
in this context. 
Present-at-hand and ready-to-hand: According to Heidegger, ”the present-at-
hand way of being in which entities are encountered as objects with properties is a 
derivative way that humans can relate to the world (for example to reflect mindfully) 
that is grounded ultimately in our practical understanding of the work (for example 
through using equipment).” [27] (p. 277). However, we have to be careful that present-
at-hand and ready-to-hand are not two different types of entities. “Instead, all entities 
oscillate between these two separate modes: the cryptic withdrawal of readiness-to-
hand and the explicit accessibility of present-at-hand.” [28] (p. 19). For example, we 
can deal with chair as present-at-hand entity. This is a reflective observation of any 
object. For example, we make observation of the properties of chairs from distance 
rather than its use in practice. But, the affordances of chair is revealed when we use it 
in a particular context, let’s say in wedding ceremony in this context. (See also the 
related discussion of “object/tool shift” [29-31]) 2 
Breakdown can refer to a permanent breakdown (obstructive) e.g. unable to find a 
chair. It also refers to temporary breakdown (obstinate) e.g. some part of the chair is 
missing, or malfunction (conspicuous) e.g. the chair is not appropriate in a particular 
context. The chair transform from the ready-to-hand mode to the present-at-hand object 
when its leg cracks. Once it becomes obtrusive, no longer functioning effectively, then 
we pay attention to its properties. Inability to identify affordances triggers a breakdown. 
We may also appropriate the chair for other affordances such as using the chair as 
firewood. However, based on our familiarity or in other terms because of the historicity 
of the chair, using chair as firewood is not a primary way of dealing with chairs. (See 
also Koschmann et al.’s [32] comparative analysis of the breakdown concept between 
Heidegger, Leont'ev, and Dewey.) 
Equipment is not just a specific piece of tool, but a system of tool(s) that are in use 
in a particular context. The encounter with the equipment can be in a ready-to-hand 
mode means when we understand something not primarily by observation but by use. 
In other terms, we use the equipment “in-order-to” gets something done for the sake 
of “towards-which” someone. For example, chair as equipment in relation to other 
chairs, tables, knife and forks, foods, dining hall, etc., in-order-to have dinner, for the 
sake of a wedding ceremony. 
Referential totality is a ”web of meaning, a significant whole. It is the arena in 
which things make sense to us and fit into our lives. It is the overall scheme in which 
we can act, produce, think and be.” [26] (p. 52). In order to reveal affordances of some 
                                                          
2 We thank Sampsa Hyysalo for bringing to our attention that the difference between the ’present-
at-hand’ and ’ready-to-hand’ modes is known as the ’object/tool shift’, and is a central topic 
in both activity theory and category theory. 
entities more clearly, we have to place it within a particular context (or referential 
totality). The meaning of affordances does not mean enquiring about entities and its 
properties instead, we have to pay attention to equipment as it reveals itself in use.  In 
ready-to-hand mode, all entities involved form the ‘referential totality’ and do not 
remain as individual items of equipment, but a referential whole without parts [28]. For 
example, affordances of chair in the context of wedding ceremony. 
5   Analysis through the Heideggerian perspective 
We provide a discussion of the various views presented in our eight examples 
through the lens of Heidegger. 
From the Heideggerian perspective there are two ways of understanding the being 
of entities, for example when we say a chair is in the dark room [13]. It means the chair 
with properties exist in the dark room but it is in present-at-hand mode. But the 
affordances always perceived and actualized when we really involved in some activities 
with the chair in relation to some particular context or ‘referential totality’. 
The other important concept in this regard is ‘familiarity’. The term familiarity 
suggests that we all are thrown into the world where we are conditioned by certain 
cultural and social norms. Therefore, we have primordial understanding of affordances 
of entities around us. For example, why do the authors think that if we put the chair into 
the dark room the affordances still exist because he has primordial understanding of the 
chair and it makes sense to see affordances of chair in author’s referential totality? 
However, if we throw that chair to some location where the tribes have never seen the 
chair then they might either not see the affordances or appropriate it for some other 
purpose. The idea of familiarity is visible in the example by Dreyfus [20], and in 
discussion about ‘canonical affordances’ [14, 24]. 
Looking at the properties of chair and then actualizing the affordances in 
Heideggerian term is to go from present-at-hand mode to ready-to-hand mode. 
However, Heidegger said in everydayness we do not observe properties, but just use it 
(e.g., we just sit on the chair and do not care about the properties of the chair). Having 
said that the properties of chair are important to provide functional affordances, but in 
everyday practice we never reflect on the properties, but put the chair into referential 
totality, for example in an office or in a dining room or in a theatre. Heidegger, however, 
mentioned that whenever we get into breakdown situation, for example if the chairs leg 
is removed or size of the chair is smaller than dining table then we get back to present-
at-hand (i.e. “unreadiness-to-hand” [27]) mode and appropriate the chair according to 
the context. Therefore, that it become ready-to-hand equipment and make sense in 
referential totality. 
It is true that a chair can have multiple affordances. However, people share historical 
understanding about chairs. According to Pynt & Higgs [33], history of seating starts 
from about 3000 BC. The understanding of chairs is so deeply related to the activity of 
sitting, that sitting is almost inseparable from the idea of a chair. Additionally, while 
using chair’s affordances we pay attention to social norms. For example, a chair placed 
in a palace cannot be used to stand on, even though it might have that affordance. The 
familiarity for a majority of people is to use chair primarily for sitting. The affordance 
of sitting is what largely defines the chair according to social norms. Therefore, 
affordances are always cultural-historical understanding among people in a particular 
context and delimited by social norms. If we start to use chair as a staircase instead of 
sitting, this according to Heidegger it is not proper use of equipment [1]. Alternatively, 
to change the traditional identity of a chair as staircase, we have to change the social 
norms, educate the people and re-define its meaning considering referential totality. For 
example, Heidegger’s terminology in ‘Being and Time’, used in this paper, are 
examples of overcoming traditional language barriers in Western philosophy. 
Certainly, we have a very long history of chairs, and chairs have usually served the 
purpose of sitting. Most of the people are used to chairs and take the idea of a chair for 
granted. The idea of chair is extremely well established in our Western culture [20]. 
This is in line with Heidegger’s concept of familiarity: a chair is for sitting because we 
have learned that it is for sitting. Alternatively, our distant ancestors have had a need to 
sit and they have created some sit-able objects that they have called chairs. We present-
day Western people have come to that cultural-historical understanding since our birth. 
That is a very strong version of Heideggerian familiarity on the object class level. 
Nevertheless, how about objects with graded membership to chairs? For example, 
the affordances of a bench, a stool, a footstool, a sofa, a throne, a rocking chair, or a 
sgabello3, may not be as obvious as the master-class of ‘chair’. More specifically, far 
from obvious are the affordance-boundaries between each of these classes. 
The way of understanding affordances in present-at-hand mode is to stand in front 
of chair, and subconsciously analyze properties and identify the affordances of it. 
However, if we think in a day-to-day human activity than we do not pay much attention 
to the particular properties of the chair. Another example is entering our office, we just 
go, sit, and start talking to people, or check email. Even the chair may be “invisible” to 
us when we are engaged in our activities. What we experience is affordances, not 
properties. 
Heidegger stated that when we are absorbed in day-to-day activities, the goal and 
purpose also disappear [1]. Even if we get tired, it is not as if we contemplate that we 
are tired, and that chair has those affordances of sit-ability and rest-ability, and then sit. 
What we do in reality is just sit and start doing other activities like talking to friends, 
listening to music, reading books, etc.  
Chairs and sitting go so tightly together that un-sit-ability takes away from the 
‘chairness’ of a chair.4 In general, chairs provide the affordance of sitting – that is to 
what we are accustomed. Because “one sits on chairs” [14, 20, 24], we do not even need 
a physical chair – or a user – to prove sit-ability. Sitting is already embedded in the idea 
of a chair. Of course, a designer can build a chair that is only sit-able in a particular 
                                                          
3 Sgabello is an Italian Renaissance era back-stool. This example underlines the notion of 
Heideggerian familiarity. What a sgabello affords is far from obvious to a contemporary man. 
In the 16th century House of Medici that had probably been common knowledge. 
4 This claim raised much discussion in the IRIS working group. Fellow discussants listed several 
examples of chairs that are made purposely un-sittable. For example, Tone Bratteteig 
mentioned some public benches in Oslo, where a spiky surface had been added. The spiky 
surface was interpreted as a designed feature signalling that the benches were not for sitting. 
The spikes were removed after a public debate as the bench owners did not want to be 
interpreted as hostile towards potential "sitters". Our point is that the benches were perceived 
as ”benchy”, while they did not afford sitting – at least not comfortably and for a long time. 
context by particular people, while not in other contexts by other people. However, a 
chair that is across all contexts un-sit-able raises a doubt of its chair-ness. In a sense, an 
object that claims the identity of an established category (e.g. chair) needs to live 
according to certain expectations. Implicit and explicit social norms exist for a chair to 
be accepted as a chair.   
Familiarity is also linked to perception; an unconventionally designed chair may not 
be perceivable as sit-able immediately during the first encounter. In more careful 
investigation an artifact can be found to be perfectly sit-able, and then properly 
understood as a chair.5 
This brings us into another big question: what is sitting, then? Sitting on a toilet seat, 
on a recliner, and on a throne, are not the same activity – yet they are variations of 
sitting. Should we then open the black box – not only of “sitting” – but also of all the 
activities we attach to the affordance concept? 
The examples from Dreyfus [20] and Jarzabkowski & Pinch [19] bring social norms, 
power, and human ability into the picture. Bodily abilities indeed affect the perception 
and actualization of affordances. Heidegger does not explicitly mention this, however, 
one of his followers, Merleau Ponty, in his ‘phenomenology of perception’ argued that 
human body plays an important role in perceiving and actualizing affordances. 
Even though an artifact may afford a sphere of unintended actions, those actions may 
not be socially appropriate. Some actions may be against the law or against the social 
conventions. When you notice these boundaries of social acceptance, we may raise 
questions of where do the boundaries come from? How were these norms established 
in the first place? How can we change these norms? 
A chair in a dark room [13] may afford sit-ability, but under the condition that the 
person is able to locate the chair in the first place. In other words, the dark room 
example emphasizes potentiality and takes actualization for granted. In reality, the low 
visibility in the dark room may create a situation in which that potentiality is difficult 
to actualize. Instead of the person being able to sit, he may stumble on objects, fall 
down, and get hurt. 
 
Connection to the IS field 
 
The affordance concept has gained strong ground among researchers who study use 
of technology in accomplishing tasks in organizing. These researchers who work 
mostly in the fields of information systems and organizational studies, have 
appropriated the concept differently, as is visible in the text by Jarzabkowski and Pinch 
[19]. IT-organizing scholars view an affordance to “emerge in relation to the activities 
of those using the objects” [19] (p. 582). In this thinking promoted particularly by the 
students of sociomateriality, affordance comes to reality in a performed relationship, 
i.e. in practice [19, 34]. 
This IT-organizing view brings context in the picture, as actual people in a particular 
place and time establish relationships. Affordances are established through interaction, 
and may involve learning, creativity such as repurposing, and explorations of trial and 
error. Mutual relationality does not privilege the designer’s role, as the user also 
                                                          
5 Of course, many objects that are not chairs are still sitable. In other words, the affordance of 
sitting is not exclusively associated with chairs. 
“designs” the assemblage of objects and negotiates within her social configuration in a 
particular time and space. This view lacks any determinism. Jarzabkowski and Pinch 
[19] (p. 582) formulate that: 
“(..) any object may afford multiple possibilities that are beyond those purposes for 
which it was designed (…). That is; an object may be repurposed in situated human 
interactions (…). For example, a chair affords more activities than the designed 
purpose of sitting, such as being repurposed as a step for reaching a high object, as a 
lock under a door handle, as firewood when broken, or even, imaginatively, as a shield 
for modesty, as so aptly illustrated in Lewis Morley’s iconic 1963 photo of Christine 
Keeler in the aftermath of the Profumo affair. Yet, such repurposing, while enabled by 
the many creative impulses of human action, is not infinite.” 
The idea here from IS perspective is when we design an artifact, we have to have 
understanding of referential totality. At the same time, we need to have understanding 
of users everyday activities, how they experience the artifact based on their familiarity. 
If the artifact does not make sense in their totality and everyday familiarity then they 
will always find herself in breakdown situation. 
The example of chair, with its “canonical affordance” for sitting, also provides us 
the reminder to focus on situated cultural-historical meanings. It is not just designers 
who give meanings, or users who construct meanings. Certain meanings are already 
given prior to the existence of any particular artifact is designed or put into use. 
Familiarity has implications for designers as well. Designers need to be familiar with 
the referential totality and understanding of the everyday use. This does not guarantee 
designing the perfect artifact, but provide an idea to design suitable artifact that can be 
appropriated with use. We need to first observe the day-to-day activities, and then we 
derive the properties of the artifact. 
A final aspect is that of socially appropriate behavior and affordances. Extant 
research has either incorporated social designation inside the affordance concept, as 
Fayard & Weeks did in their 2007 paper [35]. Another way is to address social 
designation and normativity through another concept such as habitus, in the way of 
Fayard & Weeks in their 2014 paper [34]. 
6   Conclusion 
We have not engaged deep into theoretical acrobatics in the present article concerning 
the plethora of affordance definitions [e.g. 6]. Instead of arguing for the one correct 
definition, we have provide an encouragement for researchers to embrace the different 
perspectives from which affordance can be viewed. 
In summary, in our everyday existence we are always engaged with other Dasein 
and equipment (ready-to-hand entities) and construct or reconstruct our ‘World’. We 
are already thrown into the world ‘being-in-the-world’ and have pre-understanding 
(familiarity) of the context through our involvement in everyday practice; the 
understanding can be vague though. Therefore, any entity we encounter makes some 
meaning to us based on the familiarity to our existing practice. However, if we 
encounter entities that are unfamiliar to us (or defined by context-independent 
properties) then the entities are just a present-at-hand entity and not equipment for us, 
consequently we cannot comprehend the practical meaning or another term we cannot 
actualize the affordances.  
The implications of Heidegger’s perspective to the IS researchers and practitioners 
is that the entity that we deal with is not defined by its properties (present-at-hand) 
mode, but to understand its place in a practice (ready-to-hand), in our terms to 
understand its affordances in referential totality. 
We can never know all potentiality that is hidden in technologies. Context and 
rationality matter a lot for affordances, and thus should not be neglected. Good design 
needs to support the actualization of object-embedded potentiality in its context. If a 
chair is mostly used in dark rooms [13], the actualization of potentiality may be 
supported using fluorescent paint, for instance. 
Through this ‘Heideggerian lens’, we have attempted to bring forth the confusion 
that we have identified with the affordance concept. Even with a simple example of 
‘chair’, the affordance concept gets rather ambiguous and multifaceted. Now, as 
information systems researchers, we are studying much more complex phenomena than 
chairs – for example: enterprise systems, social media, and information infrastructures. 
The trouble with the affordance concept is enormous (see also our related analysis in 
IS [36], and Kaptelinin’s analysis in HCI [37]). 
In sum, this article has provided more questions than answers. Luckily, this is a 
fruitful starting point for future research to address the conceptual specificity dilemma. 
Maybe we should supplement the affordance concept with new concepts to increase 
granularity and specificity. Another possibility is that we get rid of the concept, and 
replace it with a better vocabulary.6 
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